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Legal and institutional foundations of adaptive environmental governance
Daniel A. DeCaro 1, Brian C. Chaffin 2, Edella Schlager 3, Ahjond S. Garmestani 4 and J.B. Ruhl 5
ABSTRACT. Legal and institutional structures fundamentally shape opportunities for adaptive governance of environmental resources
at multiple ecological and societal scales. Properties of adaptive governance are widely studied. However, these studies have not resulted
in consolidated frameworks for legal and institutional design, limiting our ability to promote adaptation and social-ecological resilience.
We develop an overarching framework that describes the current and potential role of law in enabling adaptation. We apply this
framework to different social-ecological settings, centers of activity, and scales, illustrating the multidimensional and polycentric nature
of water governance. Adaptation typically emerges organically among multiple centers of agency and authority in society as a relatively
self-organized or autonomous process marked by innovation, social learning, and political deliberation. This self-directed and emergent
process is difficult to create in an exogenous, top-down fashion. However, traditional centers of authority may establish enabling
conditions for adaptation using a suite of legal, economic, and democratic tools to legitimize and facilitate self-organization,
coordination, and collaboration across scales. The principles outlined here provide preliminary legal and institutional foundations for
adaptive environmental governance, which may inform institutional design and guide future scholarship.
Key Words: adaptive governance; climate change; design principles; environmental law; social-ecological resilience; state-reinforced self-
governance; water governance
INTRODUCTION
To cope with stressors like climate change, economic instability,
and socio-political or ideological shifts, environmental
governance needs to formally embrace a broader set of
environmental actors, organizations, and institutions, and
become more flexible, responsive, and innovative (Folke et al.
2005, Chaffin and Gunderson 2016). Vital natural resources are
collapsing throughout the world because of unsustainable
environmental practices (MEA 2005, FAO 2012) driven by
outdated conceptions of nature (Clark et al. 1979, Garmestani
and Allen 2014), antiquated assumptions about political
engagement (Bingham et al. 2005, Ostrom 2010), rigid and poor-
fitting policies (Folke et al. 2007, Arnold and Gunderson 2013),
and failure of traditional modes of environmental governance to
tolerate uncertainty, or adapt to changing social and
environmental conditions (e.g., Ruhl 2011, Cosens et al. 2014).
These shortcomings threaten human welfare (Dietz et al. 2009)
by contributing to poverty, conflict, and degraded societal
conditions (IUCN 1980, 2008). Adaptive governance, as a
concept (Chaffin et al. 2014a), seeks to overcome these problems
by recognizing the need for systemic change, and incorporating
elements of learning (e.g., experimentation), collective
cooperation, and human ingenuity (e.g., creativity; Westley et al.
2011, 2013).  
Adaptive governance often emerges among multiple centers of
agency and authority in society as a relatively self-organized or
autonomous process (Chaffin and Gunderson 2016). Such
adaptation is often triggered by crisis (Gunderson et al. 1995) or
to address voids left by more traditional forms of governance
(Ostrom 1990, 2010, Lubell et al. 2002). Hence, adaptation
remains highly fragmented and uncoordinated (e.g., Tobin 1999),
as many different environmental stakeholders seek to address the
specific problems and social-ecological conditions that have
shaped their situation (Folke et al. 2005). As such, “adaptive
governance” has historically been more of a fragmented and
reactive process, i.e., adaptation, than a formalized and coherent
governance system, or approach (Chaffin et al. 2014a).  
Governance systems can theoretically be designed to facilitate
and embrace adaptation, helping society navigate important
transitions more gracefully (Shivakumar 2005, Cosens et al.
2017). Most environmental stakeholders, ranging from
government agencies to grassroots organizations, have some
inherent capacity for innovation, decision making, and
governance (e.g., Ostrom 1990, 1992). Many scholars argue that
some legal and institutional, or rule-governed, oversight (Wheeler
2000, Dietz et al. 2003, Ruhl 2011), or built-in mechanisms for
adaptation, for example in the law (Arnold and Gunderson 2013,
Clarvis et al. 2014, Craig and Ruhl 2014), could facilitate, and
perhaps coordinate, this inherent potential for adaptation,
improving adaptive governance. Specifically, traditional centers
of authority, like federal and state government, could create laws
and legal frameworks to enhance the ability, authority, and
resources, i.e., adaptive capacity, of existing environmental
stakeholders to make important decisions and flexibly respond
to changing social-ecological conditions (e.g., Shivakumar 2005,
Clarvis et al. 2014, Cosens et al. 2017).  
One of the biggest challenges for this vision of adaptive
governance is to develop formal legal frameworks—legal
principles, laws, and regulatory mechanisms—that support such
adaptation without stifling stakeholders’ inherent self-organizing
potential or the emergent properties of adaptation itself. The
current article addresses this problem by developing an
overarching framework to conceptualize and analyze the current
and potential role of law in creating favorable conditions for
adaptation, across multiple stakeholders and centers of
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governance activity. We build on prior work by combining
theories of ecological resilience (e.g., Holling 2001), adaptive law
(e.g., Craig 2010, Ruhl 2011), self-governance (e.g., Ostrom 1990),
and state-reinforced self-governance, which is the concept of
traditional government actively supporting self-governance of
grassroots stakeholders (e.g., Sarker 2013). We also outline legal
and institutional design principles for adaptive governance. These
design principles are preliminary and nonexhaustive, but illustrate
some important ways traditional centers of authority can create
enabling conditions for adaptation, using a suite of
complementary legal, economic, and democratic tools, which
authorize, fund, and complement greater decision making and
problem-solving capacity of environmental stakeholders. The
analytical conventions developed in this article are intended to
provide vital guidance for future research.  
Given the interdisciplinary nature of this project, we think it is
important to first explain how we synthesize the many concepts,
analytical frameworks, and empirical findings that are the basis
for the current framework. We then introduce our interpretation
of “emergence,” “self-organization,” and “adaptation,” which the
proposed framework seeks to facilitate, using legal and
institutional foundations. Afterward, we discuss the concepts of
ecological resilience and adaptive cycles, which we used to
conceptualize dynamics of adaptive governance. We focus on
water governance throughout the article, because water resources
play an increasingly critical role in resource scarcity challenges
worldwide (Garrick et al. 2013, UNESCO 2015). The current
work arose from the Adaptive Water Governance Project (Cosens
et al. 2014), an interdisciplinary team of legal scholars, ecologists,
and social scientists who sought to understand how current legal
and institutional systems contribute to adaptive (or maladaptive)
environmental governance within six United States watershed
basins. After introducing these conventions, we outline the
candidate design principles and illustrate their potential
application in cases spanning different areas of law, centers of
governance activity, social-ecological systems (SESs), and scales.
We conclude with future directions, providing guidance for
further refinement and exploration.
OVERVIEW OF SYNTHESIS: CONCEPTUAL AND
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
The characteristics of adaptive governance (Dietz et al. 2003,
Brunner et al. 2005, Folke et al. 2005, Ruhl 2011), self-governance
(Ostrom 1990, 2014), and the adaptive management of
environmental resource systems (Holling 1978, Allen and
Garmestani 2015) have been widely studied (Cox et al. 2010,
Chaffin et al. 2014a). Generally speaking, adaptive processes are
flexible, e.g., open to revision, iterative decision making, and
experimentation; innovative; participatory; and “polycentric,” or
spread across multiple centers of activity, social networks, and
environmental stakeholders in a pluralistic decision-making
context (Armitage 2007, Pahl-Wostl 2009). Thus, whereas many
scholars have asked, “What is adaptive governance? What are its
core characteristics?” (Chaffin et al. 2014a), very few have
examined how adaptive governance may be facilitated by legal
frameworks and other institutional (“rule-governed”) structures
(Shivakumar 2005, Sarker 2013; see also, Cosens et al. 2017).  
To explore legal and institutional foundations of adaptive
governance, we found it useful to think about adaptation in terms
of its emergent and self-organizing properties. We developed a
novel convention of “emergence frontiers” to conceptualize
opportunities and constraints placed on emergence in SESs by
legal and institutional structures and processes. We also adopted
and adapted Ostrom’s (2005, 2010) concepts of “self-
governance” and “action situations,” as well as Sarker’s (2013)
concept of “state-reinforced self-governance,” to conceptualize
how legal and institutional factors in particular social-ecological
settings influence environmental decision making and
cooperative aspects of emergence and self-organization. Ostrom
and Sarker’s conventions provide insight into broader socio-
political, cooperative, and institutional aspects of governance,
grounded in the existing work of Ostrom Institutional Analyses
(Cole and McGinnis 2015). Our framework also draws from a
range of disciplinary traditions, including dynamic federalism
(e.g., Engel 2006) and reflexive law (e.g., Ruhl 2011, Garmestani
and Benson 2013), new governance (e.g., Bingham et al. 2005),
political economy (e.g., Schlager et al. 2012), and public
participation and social justice research (e.g., Cosens 2013,
DeCaro and Stokes 2013), in addition to research on resilience
of complex SESs (e.g., Gunderson and Holling 2002, Ostrom
2014, Chaffin and Gunderson 2016).  
The tools and conventions of the proposed framework help to
conceptualize complex interactions among the law, institutions,
and the environment from an adaptive governance standpoint.
Our primary goal is to demonstrate how existing concepts and
frameworks can be synthesized, strengthening their analytical
and conceptual power, and revealing preliminary design
principles that can be investigated to better understand legal and
institutional foundations of adaptive governance.
EMERGENCE
The concept of emergence has been used to describe the
innovative and relatively spontaneous nature of adaptive
processes in environmental governance (Chaffin and Gunderson
2016). Adaptation often emerges through creative processes
initiated by highly motivated or imperiled environmental
stakeholders (Gunderson et al. 1995), which range from
government agencies and officials, to members of the public,
tribal nations, and grassroots organizations (Cosens et al. 2014).
All of these stakeholders, and their centers of governance
activity, have some capacity for self-organization, in terms of
semiautonomous decision making, rule making, and the
implementation of solutions. However, these are shaped by
existing legal and institutional systems (Ostrom 1971, 1994).
Furthermore, some stakeholders are able to self-organize into
relatively autonomous groups, e.g., partnerships or social
networks, creating or modifying laws, regulatory systems, rules,
operational procedures, norms, or a collective vision to manage
a social-ecological dilemma (Ostrom 2010, 2014, Sarker 2013).
In this paper, we are interested in understanding fundamental
enabling conditions of adaptive governance for a range of such
centers of governance activity.
Centers of activity
To illustrate the concept of centers of activity, we discuss
watershed governance. Case studies in water governance
highlight many stakeholders and governance activities,
demonstrating the complexity of SES governance (Cosens et al.
2014).  
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For example, grassroots watershed organizations in the U.S.
create bylaws, select decision-making boards, and are actively
engaged in environmental monitoring, advocacy, and
restoration projects; they often monitor formal government
agencies and local industry to ensure compliance with water
regulations, and advocate for inclusion in important
governmental decisions (e.g., Sabatier et al. 2005, Arnold et al.
2014, Chaffin et al. 2014b). Grassroots organizations can emerge
with or without formal government support, though support
could potentially enhance their work and success (e.g., Koontz
and Johnson 2004).  
Some communities organize community-based governance
systems (Ostrom 1990) that independently manage a resource
(e.g., Bardhan 2000), address a watershed problem, or
complement formal government activities by filling regulatory
or management gaps (Lubell et al. 2002, Benson et al. 2013).
Well-organized groups not only adapt (Ostrom 2014), but may
also trigger adaptive governance processes throughout a SES,
using lawsuits, public advocacy, and other methods to influence
legal systems (Wheeler 2000). Grassroots organizers of many
kinds, e.g., farmers, tribes, homeowners, and business owners,
are frequently instrumental in the formation of emergent
governance processes in U.S. river basins (Cosens et al. 2014),
for example, the Anacostia (Arnold et al. 2014) and Columbia
(Cosens and Fremier 2014).  
Government agencies carry out various legal mandates,
enforcing the law, and allocating and managing official
government resources (Larson et al. 2013). Many agencies are
involved in international and interstate river basin compacts,
governing transboundary water problems with other
government agencies and stakeholders situated in different
geopolitical regions (Heikkila et al. 2011, Cosens and Fremier
2014). They also participate in collaboratives with
nongovernment stakeholders (e.g., Arnold et al. 2014). Agencies
often need more legal, financial, and organizational
commitment to engage in self-governing activities (e.g., Craig
and Ruhl 2014, Cosens et al. 2017) or contribute to joint
governance processes (Genskow and Born 2006). As discussed
later, agencies and their legal mandates also sometimes inhibit
adaption, undermining other stakeholders’ self-governance and
generally resisting systemic change (e.g., Marshall 2007), partly
because of rigid or unsupportive legal frameworks (e.g.,
Bingham 2009, 2010).  
Bridging structures, like partnerships and compacts, and
organizations, like NGOs and universities, frequently serve as
liaisons among different centers of activity, helping them to
reconcile scales, share information, and coordinate (Cash et al.
2006, Gerlak and Heikkila 2011, Garmestani and Benson 2013).
Lack of such bridges contributes to scale mismatches, poor
coordination, conflict, and missed opportunities for system-
wide coordination and adaptation (e.g., Prager 2010, Chen and
Ganapin 2016).  
These examples illustrate that there are many centers of activity
in environmental governance fulfilling different, potentially
complementary, roles that need facilitation from a legal and
institutional standpoint. In reality, stakeholders and centers of
activity may overlap and interact in complex ways. For example,
members of tribal nations can influence river basin governance
individually, aggregated into groups, in multistakeholder
partnerships, and via more formal compacts and agreements (e.g.,
Chaffin et al. 2014b). We display some generic examples of these
centers of activity and their potential linkages in Figure 1 (see
Larson et al. 2013, Sarker 2013 for concrete examples).  
As described later, we envision that adaptive governance should
seek to facilitate, e.g., authorize and fund, emergent adaptive
processes among each of these centers of activity, and enhance
their capacity for self-organization and coordination. The purpose
of Fig. 1 is to draw attention to the immense scope of this
undertaking, identifying important areas for research.  
In the current paper, we primarily focus on aspects of law, like the
federal Administrative Procedures Act, and predecision
assessment statutes like the National Environmental Policy Act,
that determine the authority given to governmental and
nongovernmental stakeholders to make decisions, create rules, and
carry out those solutions (e.g., Craig and Ruhl 2014). We also focus
on some aspects of substantive law, which deal with compliance
(e.g., Arnold and Gunderson 2013), and aspects of administrative
law that influence how members of the general public collaborate
with traditional government (e.g., Bingham 2009, 2010), as well as
self-govern (e.g., Bingham et al. 2005, Shivakumar 2005). However,
we do not address equally important aspects of common law (Ruhl
2011, Green et al. 2014), or discuss foundational aspects of
property law or litigation (Arnold and Gunderson 2013), that also
influence adaptation and self-organization because these do not
focus explicitly on governance scope and authority. Moreover, the
design principles that we eventually discuss represent only an
important subset of potential principles (Table 1). We selected
these principles because they consistently emerged as important
aspects of adaptation and semiautonomous self-organization in
the case studies we observed in the Adaptive Water Governance
Project. They also appear to apply to a broad range of stakeholders
and governance activities, representing multiple aspects and
functions of law, e.g., administration, regulation, quasi-legislation.
Thus, we strive to delineate the core problem and offer some
important initial steps toward addressing some major dimensions
of it, helping guide future research.
Emergence frontiers
Because of the self-organizing properties of adaptive governance,
we found it useful to think about emergence and adaptation in
terms of “emergence frontiers,” which are delineated by prevailing
legal frameworks and social-ecological conditions. The emergence
frontier concept illustrates the expansion and contraction of
capacity, authority, and resources—or “space” for adaptation
(“adaptive capacity”)—within a particular center of activity, as
contextualized within an SES and bounded by existing legal
conditions (Fig. 2). Legal systems play a major role in creating this
space, or latitude, for adaptation by establishing the authority,
formal rules, and procedures that government agencies, and other
societal stakeholders, e.g., NGOs, industries, or communities,
operate within (Bingham 2010, Cosens et al. 2017). For example,
Congress delegates substantive authority to U.S. environmental
agencies, like the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, to manage
environmental resources. However, the federal Administrative
Procedure Act, predecision assessment statutes like the National
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Fig. 1. Example centers of activity in environmental governance. Layers represent linked social systems or
subsystems within society. Rounded boxes (e.g., Federal Gov’t) represent centers of environmental governance
activity or decision-making situations (e.g., policy making), which may be involved in adaptive governance.
Circles represent subunits within centers (e.g., Federal Agencies), and are also decision situations. Arrows depict
structural, procedural (e.g., informational, decision-making), and institutional (rule-governed) linkages and
interactions; these ties may be strong or weak, depending on context. We assume that centers and layers are
linked (not shown for clarity). This representation is not intended to imply a particular priority, or hierarchy,
among layers/units; also, it is not exhaustive, but illustrative. Adapted and expanded from Sarker (2013).
Environmental Policy Act, and other impact assessment steps
limit agency self-organization and adaptation by requiring
comprehensive upfront cost-benefit analysis, assessment studies,
public participation, and judicial review before acting (Craig and
Ruhl 2014).  
Legal systems and traditional governance authorities are also
subject to change and can influence their own adaptation, further
contributing to dynamics surrounding emergence frontiers. For
example, the federal Administrate Procedures Act, Endangered
Species Act, and aspects of the U.S. Constitution, have already
undergone some change, altering emergence frontiers of some
government agencies as well as nongovernment stakeholder
groups and programs (e.g., Arnold and Gunderson 2013, Craig
et al. 2017). Moreover, in complex governance systems, legal
provisions and governance actors are often embedded in broader
governing arrangements, which also shape and constrain
emergence in complex ways. For example, in New York City, water
quality is governed through a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) between the City, multiple jurisdictions in the Catskills
and Delaware watersheds, and the state of New York (NYC
Watershed MOA 1997). Rule-making and permitting processes
in this system are governed by different State and City
Administrative Procedure Acts, depending on scale; the MOA
allows each entity engaged in water quality governance to
participate in devising rules and regulations, which impact their
interests and the joint cooperative agreement (Platt et al. 2000,
Galusha 2002).  
We represent these kinds of opportunities and constraints as a
solid box in Fig. 2, illustrating how legal provisions and broader
governance contexts influence the space in which adaptation can
emerge in a “focal center of activity,” e.g., a local watershed
association. Overly rigid legal provisions may confine, or box in,
emergence, pushing the emergence frontier inward and
constraining adaptation. However, as just mentioned, legislative
and other legal centers of activity can also change and legal
systems can adapt (Cosens et al. 2017), further broadening and
constraining emergence frontiers in affected centers of activity
(illustrated by “//” in Fig. 2). Many factors affect emergence, hence
the solid box also signifies the presence of contextualizing factors
like politics, economy, culture, and the biophysical environment,
which influence environmental governance in particular SESs.  
In complex governance systems, the focal center of activity is often
linked to other centers of activity (e.g., Larson et al. 2013). We
represent these linkages, and their potential effect on emergence
in the focal center of activity, using additional boxes situated at
different scales (Fig. 2). These linkages (“linked centers”) also
have emergence frontiers, indicating their potential for adaptation
and subsequent effects on other centers and systems. For example,
in Fig. 2 we illustrate a local watershed association involved in
water governance that is linked with the Environmental
Protection Agency, municipal government, and a smaller
grassroots organization.  
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Table 1. Candidate legal and institutional design principles of adaptive governance.
 
Legal Design Principles
 
Reflexive
Does not rely on static rules, e.g., fixed water allocations, when flexibility is needed. Standards, priorities, and procedures guide decision
making.
[Example:] National Civic League (2013) amendments to city charters and U.S. Administrative Procedures Act, defining standards of
“adequate” public participation and outlining mechanisms to allow agency discretion in meeting those standards.
Legal Sunsets
Planned periods of comprehensive evaluation, in which environmental policies and agreements can be periodically examined, renegotiated,
and potentially modified.
[Example:] Craig and Ruhl (2014) amendments to U.S. Administrative Procedures Act, outlining periods when environmental agencies may
test alternative policies, programs, without external review.
Legally Binding Authority
Authority to make decisions and implement chosen solutions is institutionalized in binding legislation, for multiple centers of governance
activity in polycentric society, e.g., agencies, communities, regional governments.
[Example:] Land-use laws, giving individual farmers authority to self-organize in increasingly complex collective decision-making structures,
parallel to formal government at local, state, and national levels (Sarker 2013).
Legally Binding Responsibility
Formal definition and assignment of responsibility to resolve, or contribute to resolution, of a social-ecological dilemma, or element thereof.
[Example:] U.S. State of Oregon requiring local and regional governments to align their development plans with 1970 Statewide Planning
Goals (Wheeler 2000).
Tangible Support
Assistance from national, state, and local government, etc., in the form of dedicated and sufficient funds, technology, information, and
training to meet one’s legally binding responsibilities and pursue one’s legally granted authority.
[Example:] Individual farmers (Sarker 2013) and local and regional governments (Wheeler 2000) given tangible assistance from state and
national authorities; Coral Reef Conservation Act, providing funding for research, restoration, and technical training for coral reef
management (Green et al. 2014).
Institutional Design Principles†
 
Well-Defined Boundaries
Political, institutional, and ecosystem boundaries of the social-ecological dilemma are well defined, clarifying legal and institutional
jurisdiction.
[Example:] River compacts (e.g., Platte River, Recovery and Implementation Program; Birge et al. 2014), and water management agreements
(e.g., 1997 NYC Watershed Memorandum of Agreement), which clarified sociopolitical, legal, and institutional boundaries, and refined
sector, or subsystem jurisdiction (see also, Schlager and Heikkila 2011).
Participatory Decision Making
Variety of participatory methods and processes used so that affected stakeholders can influence design and implementation of governance
systems that affect them.
[Example:] National Civic League (2013) and Bingham (2009, 2010) amendments to U.S. Administrative Procedures Act, city charters, etc.
to clarify adequate public participation and create more robust legal support for collaborative governance.
Internal Enforcement
In addition to external monitoring and enforcement systems, organizations and collectives, e.g., partners, compacts, communities, have
internal mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance.
[Example:] 2012 NYC Watershed Memorandum of Agreement, South Platte River Compact in context of the Platte River Recovery and
Implementation Program (Birge et al. 2014), and traditional community-based irrigation governance (e.g., Cox 2014), which have external
and internal mechanisms to monitor and regulate stakeholder compliance, e.g., water usage and deliveries (see also, Heikkila et al. 2011).
Internal Conflict Resolution
Internal mechanisms for neutral and transparent conflict resolution.
[Example:] Traditional community-based irrigation institutions (e.g., Ostrom 1994, Cox 2014), and contemporary polycentric,
multistakeholder farmer irrigation collectives (Sarker 2013) that use communication and quasi-formal internal courts to resolve disputes
before going to external venues (see also, Schlager and Heikkila 2011).
†Primary Source: Ostrom (1990, 2010)
With this “system of systems” convention (Gianetto and Heydari
2015), one can consider how nonlinear system dynamics, e.g.,
crisis or surprise, may affect adaptation within and among
different centers of governance activity operating at different
scales and, indeed, the entire system. For example, we could
conceptualize how larger scale dynamics (e.g., modification of
federal law), interact with smaller scale dynamics (e.g.,
modification of rules and norms), within particular governance
centers (e.g., grassroots organization, tribal group), or sets of
centers (e.g., a multistakeholder decision-making council),
affecting individual centers and the entire system.  
As just one example, the federal Administrative Procedure Act
(larger scale) establishes standards for public involvement
(smaller scale) in formal government activities, such as rule
making by federal agencies (focal center). Some scholars have
criticized these standards for public participation as being poorly
defined and very limited, resulting in superficial public
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Fig. 2. Emergence frontiers. Representation of a focal center of activity or decision arena, and its polycentric
(linked) connections; explicitly highlights emergence and enabling/constraining features. Circular arrows
represent reciprocal connections.
involvement (NCL 2013), which places government agencies in
crisis because of public opposition (smaller scale; e.g., Cosens and
Fremier 2014) and undermines public-government collaboration
(intermediate scales; Bingham 2009, 2010). The interaction of
various centers at any scale may ultimately trigger system collapse
or failure, either resulting in beneficial adaptation and broadening
of emergence frontiers (e.g., Chaffin et al. 2014a) or further
rigidity and entrenchment (e.g., Gunderson et al. 2014),
depending on other contextualizing factors.  
These representations for centers of activity (Fig. 1) and their
emergence frontiers (Fig. 2) are complementary to Ostrom’s
(2009) revised concept of linked action situations, or decision
arenas, in SESs (McGinnis and Ostrom 2014), but interpreted
through a lens of resilience theory (see below). Whereas Ostrom’s
action situation focuses on factors influencing self-organization,
decision making, and cooperation in socio-environmental
dilemmas, the current approach additionally endeavors to
emphasize adaptation in complex, dynamic systems. We
demonstrate this connection and its usefulness later, when
discussing example cases (e.g., Sarker 2013).
RESILIENCE AND ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE
Many contemporary approaches to environmental governance
oversimplify the complexity and dynamism of SESs (Holling
1973, Olsson et al. 2004). These approaches often seek rigid, one-
size-fits-all governance solutions (Ostrom 2007) based on narrow,
rigidly linear conceptualizations of system dynamics (Ruhl 2011).
In some cases, these rigidities are problematic, hindering adaptive
management (Ruhl 2009, 2011). For example, the U.S.
Endangered Species Act (ESA) has been criticized as pursuing
unrealistic policies to return ecosystems to their “historical”
natural conditions in systems already transformed beyond return,
precluding more adaptive responses (Doremus 2010). The ESA
also emphasizes restoring habitat for single species, often to the
exclusion of other species (e.g., Birge et al. 2014), and generally
disregards broader social, economic, and political ramifications
of the policy, which undermines public support and limits its
effectiveness (Arnold and Gunderson 2013). Governance systems
and their policies must be responsive to these kinds of social,
ecological, and contextual issues (Epstein et al. 2015). Adaptive
governance seeks to govern SESs for these complexities,
integrating ecological and social system complexity and
uncertainty into environmental management and governance
activities (Chaffin et al. 2014a).
Resilience
From a resilience standpoint, one of the primary challenges of
adaptive governance is to develop legal frameworks and
institutional provisions that can prepare social systems to navigate
complex patterns of change and uncertainty (Cosens et al. 2014).
Scholars of adaptive governance have therefore adopted
principles of resilience to understand patterns of robustness,
resistance, and adaptability of governance systems in complex
SESs (see Chaffin et al. 2014a for review).  
“Resilience” generally refers to the ability of a SES, or component
of the system (e.g., governance center), to maintain core processes
and functions, even when faced with significant stressors
(Gunderson and Holling 2002). There are two major archetypes
of resilience (Gunderson 2000). Engineering resilience is defined
by recovery, or how rapidly a system can return to its original
state after a disturbance. SESs framed by engineering resilience,
e.g., hydraulically modified river basins, typically have been
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optimized for a particular purpose, e.g., flood control, within a
particular set of conditions, e.g., historic weather patterns,
making them effective and resistant to change (rigid) when
operating within those specified conditions, but highly susceptible
to novel stressors, e.g., climate change, and unable to adapt
accordingly. Ecological resilience is a dynamic property of SESs
characterized by system diversity, flexibility, and adaptability in
response to novel stressors and changing conditions. Ecological
resilience allows SESs to withstand a broader range of stressors
and operate under more varied conditions, without completely
collapsing or undergoing total reorganization.  
Ruhl (2011) argues that adaptive governance requires a balance
between engineered and ecological resilience, providing both
beneficial rigidity, e.g., stability or recovery, and flexibility, e.g.,
innovation, diversity, and adaptability. Some aspects of legal
systems are necessarily relatively more rigid or difficult to alter,
e.g., U.S. Constitution, to provide stability, establish societal
norms, and reinforce legal processes at different scales. Others
may need to be more flexible, e.g., administrative law, interstate
river compacts, or specific acts, to cope with dynamism and
complexity posed by governance of environmental dilemmas
(Arnold and Gunderson 2013, Craig and Ruhl 2014). Resilience
of environmental governance also applies to structure, e.g.,
organizational networks or legal frameworks; content, e.g.,
policies; and processes, e.g., decision making procedures (Cosens
et al. 2017). Adaptation to significant disturbances like climate
change may, therefore, entail any combination of rigid and flexible
components within and across scales, organizational units,
domains of law, and processes of a system (Ruhl 2011,
Garmestani and Benson 2013, Craig et al. 2017).
Adaptive governance cycles
In addition to considering properties that make SESs more
resilient, adaptive governance scholars use the concept of an
adaptive cycle (Holling 1986) and panarchy (Gunderson and
Holling 2002) to understand patterns of change in centers of
governance, operating at multiple interacting scales (Chaffin and
Gunderson 2016).  
Adaptive cycles (Fig. 3) refer to systematic patterns of
organization, collapse, and reorganization (innovation,
emergence) particular SESs, or their components, may undergo
(Holling 1986, 2001). We posit that some governance systems and
their institutions, such as legal frameworks, policies, and social
norms, follow a similar pattern (Gunderson and Holling 2002,
Castro 2012). For example, using the Endangered Species Act and
Clean Water Act, Arnold and Gunderson (2013) describe how
society at times prefers a particular legal framework (exploitation,
r), concentrates effort and consolidates resources toward using
this preferred solution (conservation, K), then encounters
inherent shortcomings that lead to its failure (release, Ω), which
triggers an opportunity for innovation and reconfiguration, or
emergence and adaptation (reorganization, α). Whether or not
and how extensively reorganization occurs depends on many
factors (DeCaro et al. 2017). Moreover, as described by panarchy
(Gunderson and Holling 2002) and supported by institutional
analysis (Anderies et al. 2004, Ostrom 2014), the developmental
trajectory of the system is also influenced by linkages to other
systems and processes, e.g., political systems or economy, which
are in their own phase(s) of adaptation, e.g., economic crisis, at
different scales. For example, policies and trajectories at national
and regional scales can facilitate or constrain change at smaller
scales, and vice-versa (e.g., Wheeler 2000). Different scales can
also change at different rates (e.g., Larson et al. 2013).
Fig. 3. Adaptive governance cycle. Representation of dynamic
cycles of change (“adaptive cycles”) that social-ecological
systems (SESs) may undergo: exploitation (r), societal,
organizational, or community preference for a particular
governance paradigm; conservation (K), consolidation and
entrenchment of a preferred paradigm or governance regime;
crisis or release (Ω), shortcomings and failures that lead to
paradigm collapse; reorganization (α), opportunity for
innovation, which may restructure or transform existing
paradigms, yielding novel governance arrangements
(emergence, adaptation). Windows of opportunity represent
emergence frontiers (Fig. 2), for particular centers of activity
(Fig. 1), in a linked SES. Change forces exerted by small and
large-scale linkages may be described by panarchy, whereas
their legal and institutional dynamics may be described by
institutional theory, such as Ostrom Institutional Analysis.
Adapted from Chaffin and Gunderson (2016).
We adopt and expand upon the notion of an adaptive governance
cycle, from an interdisciplinary institutional standpoint.
Specifically, we hypothesize that governance systems, and their
components, i.e., organizations, institutions or processes, evolve
in a relatively systematic pattern of growth, entrenchment,
collapse, and renewal (Chaffin and Gunderson 2016), but also
according to major principles of collective action (Ostrom 2010,
2014).  
For example, the Klamath River Basin in south central Oregon
and northern California, USA has undergone significant shifts in
governance as a result of indigenous displacement, ecological
fragmentation, and resource exploitation that contributed to
resource crises (Chaffin et al. 2014b). Over the past two decades,
allocation of water for irrigation and hydropower has collided
with increasing legal recognition of water rights for the basin’s
indigenous tribes, and their rights to protect habitat of culturally
significant fish. This conflict over water uses initially caused crisis
(collapse, see Fig. 3), including water scarcity during drought,
social and political upheaval, and social justice issues. However,
after exhaustion of adversarial options by contesting stakeholder
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groups (reorganization), charismatic leaders from various groups
built trust with one another, and new informal networks emerged
(window of opportunity), forging new paths toward water sharing
and social-ecological restoration (emergence). Though subject to
continuing negotiation and adaptation, these new networks and
agreements, which entail collective decision making by affected
stakeholders, joint resource monitoring and enforcement, and
negotiated socio-political and physical boundaries of
responsibility, illustrate several principles known to facilitate
cooperative resource governance and build trust, demonstrating
a connection between adaptive cycles and collective action
principles (Ostrom 1992, 2010, Schlager and Heikkila 2011).  
These cycles and cross-scale interactions do not necessarily
describe dynamics observed in all cases or scales; actual
adaptation may be more or less absolute, with multiple factors
determining evolutionary trajectory (Davidson 2010). Specific
dynamics that unfold in a given system, or scale of analysis, are
typically nonlinear and difficult to predict, requiring detailed
analyses to fully describe (e.g., Fleishman et al. 2010, Larson et
al. 2013). However, the concept of an adaptive governance cycle
provides a useful starting point to hypothesize the relationship
among multiple scales and interacting systems, which is necessary
for designing legal and institutional frameworks that can cope
with those dynamics.
Adaptive governance
In the current paper, we address potential legal and institutional
foundations of “adaptive governance,” proactive and intentional
aspects of governance, like legal systems, e.g., laws or regulatory
mechanisms, specifically designed to support adaptation and
promote cooperation among different centers of activity (see
Dietz et al. 2003, Shivakumar 2005 generally). In the U.S., many
stakeholders and centers of governance activity are adapting to
climate change, and other stressors, and they have some capacity
for self-organization. However, they are doing so within a
fragmented and arguably unsupportive legal framework, which
can stifle adaptation, e.g., restrict application of adaptive
management, limit creativity and cooperation, and contribute to
unnecessary societal and environmental catastrophes (Cosens et
al. 2014).  
We envision a more robust set of legal principles aimed at
facilitating a less fragmented and more cooperative, yet still
diverse and adaptable, approach to environmental governance.
These principles pertain to multiple legal domains, e.g.,
administrative and substantive law (Ruhl 2011, Cosens et al.
2017), and may potentially be applied across multiple scales and
centers of activity, as conceptualized by recent reinterpretations
of polycentric, federalist governance (e.g., Shivakumar 2005,
Schlager et al. 2011). Because the emergent and self-organizing
property of adaptation cannot be replicated in a top-down
fashion, we propose that traditional authorities instead strive to
create enabling conditions, which are supportive of emergence
using appropriate legal and institutional provisions.
CANDIDATE DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR ADAPTIVE
GOVERNANCE
We envision that traditional centers of authority may establish
enabling conditions for adaptation using a suite of legal,
economic, and democratic tools to authorize and further support
self-organization, and facilitate coordination. As illustrated in
Fig. 2, the space created for emergence is characterized by several
key attributes, including flexibility, decision making authority,
and for larger scales (e.g., regional government) polycentricity,
cooperation, and social-ecological fit (Folke et al. 2005, Armitage
2007, Ruhl 2011). We outline candidate legal and institutional
design principles for adaptive governance that may help create
such a space (see Table 1) and we demonstrate some key elements
of these principles in practice, using examples from selected case
studies and legal innovations.  
We define “design principles” as features of legal and other rule-
governed, i.e., institutional, systems that may be especially
important enabling conditions for self-organization and
adaptation within complex governance systems. Legal design
principles pertain to (a) elements of official legal systems that
determine structure, authority, function, and guidelines for
government agencies (e.g., administrative law) and private centers
of activity (e.g., individuals, industry, grassroots organizations)
and (b) rules and regulatory systems that deal with compliance
(e.g., substantive law like the Endangered Species Act; see also
Clarvis et al. 2014, Cosens et al. 2017 generally). Institutional
design principles refer more broadly to features of rule-governed
systems, like clearly defined socio-political and geographic
boundaries, that help collectives solve problems cooperatively;
these principles originate from Ostrom’s (1990, 2010) analysis of
self-governing communities, but may also be applied to more
formal, complex governance systems (Schlager and Heikkila
2011, Sarker 2013). It is important to address both types of
principles, because most complex governance problems involve
both formal and informal stakeholders, governance systems, and
processes.  
Given the complexity of SESs and the state of current scholarly
knowledge, we cannot anticipate every possible design feature for
adaptive governance or delve deeply into all aspects of both
formal legal principles and institutional principles. Instead, we
endeavor to provide an overview of potentially important
principles, along with their rationales. These principles are
inspired by patterns observed in U.S. river basins (see Cosens et
al. 2014 generally), and other SESs. Later, we illustrate concrete
mechanisms that embody these principles, as examples. We hope
that future research will expand and modify these principles, and
identify important boundary conditions.
Legal design principles
Reflexive law and legal sunsets: iterative decision making
One of law’s primary roles is to establish ground rules for society,
creating a sense of security and stability, which guides behavior
and enables stakeholders to cooperate, solve complex social
dilemmas, and plan for the future (Tyler 1990, 2006, Ostrom
1998). Garmestani and Benson (2013) and Craig et al. (2017)
suggest that for environmental law to enable more flexible decision
making without jeopardizing security or stability (Green et al.
2015), legal systems affected by dynamic stressors like climate
change need to emphasize standards and general principles, e.g.,
proportional water allocation principles, instead of specific rules,
e.g. fixed water allocation rules (e.g., Schlager and Heikkila 2011,
Clarvis et al. 2014). Craig et al. (2017) refer to this shift as setting
“legal floors, legal ceilings, and intelligible principles,” which, for
example, establish minimum requirements (floors), maximum
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thresholds (ceilings), or general guidelines (principles) to guide
decision making without specifying exact solutions that could
become outdated or too rigid when social-ecological conditions
change (e.g., Benson et al. 2014). These approaches embody
aspects of “reflexive law” (Teubner 1983, Orts 1995), which
advocates that legal authorities establish goals, standards, and
ground rules for engagement, but leave open final solutions, so
that decision makers have both the legal guidance and flexibility
they need to respond to complex societal dilemmas (Garmestani
and Benson 2013). These types of provisions can apply to
government agencies (e.g., Craig and Ruhl 2014), transboundary
compacts and treaties (e.g., Schlager and Heikkila 2011), and
community-based governance systems (e.g., Ostrom 1990,
2014).  
Craig et al. (2017) additionally argue that divisions of powers
(e.g., federal-state), informal legal norms (e.g., common law),
and formal sunsets on existing legal provisions enhance adaptive
capacity, specifically by (a) permitting delegation of activities to
more appropriate agencies or scales (e.g., public-government
collaboratives), (b) allowing incremental revision over long
periods of societal development, and (c) creating planned
windows of opportunity for transformative adjustment of more
weighty provisions, like water compacts and international
treaties (e.g., Cosens and Fremier 2014). Government agencies
and smaller organizations (e.g., grassroots watershed
associations) can both (a) develop inertia, preventing change,
and (b) get bogged down in continual scrutiny of their activities
(e.g., Gunderson et al. 2014). Planned windows provide a more
balanced approach to governance, providing a structured and
predictable period to reassess and change direction, thereby
safeguarding security and stability without jeopardizing equally
important aspects of flexibility and responsiveness. These design
principles fit into a larger category of iterative decision making,
an essential characteristic of adaptive governance (e.g.,
Armitage 2007, Clarvis et al. 2014).
Legally binding authority
Environmental stakeholders operating within their respective
centers of activity need some recognized authority to make
decisions, carry out plans, and otherwise self-govern (Wheeler
2000, Ostrom 2010, Sarker 2013). Law and traditional centers
of authority have a role to play in legitimizing and permitting
more decision-making latitude for stakeholders (Cosens 2013).
Case studies indicate that adaptive governance systems often
organize into a polycentric, but coherent whole, composed of
multiple stakeholders, organizations, and structures, e.g.,
partnerships, that are bound by provisions that legitimize their
authority and permit self-organization (e.g., Folke et al. 2005,
Sarker 2013). In addition to reflexive law, legal scholars have
explored foundations for such a system within dynamic
federalism (e.g., Engel 2006, Schlager et al. 2011) and
transgovernmental networks theory (e.g., Craik and DiMento
2008). Under dynamic federalism, loosely coordinated centers
of authority, like state and federal government agencies, carry
and exchange various roles, powers, and responsibilities
according to demand (Engel 2006, Adelman and Engel 2011).
According to Thomson and Arroyo (2011), this aspect of U.S.
government allowed state agencies to begin forging the way for
climate change adaptation before federal government entry into
the policy realm (Resnik et al. 2011, Schlager 2011).
Transgovernmental networks refer to the formal and informal
collaborative networks of governmental and nongovernmental
stakeholders that frequently emerge in environmental dilemmas
(e.g., Armitage 2007, Arnold et al. 2014). These governance
structures and processes may be more effectively directed toward
adaptive ends (Ruhl 2011) with formal incorporation in
environmental governance (Craik and DiMentio 2008, Erberlein
and Newman 2008).
Legally binding responsibility
Legally binding devolution of responsibility for environmental
dilemmas at different governance scales may be a necessary
component of effective adaptive governance (e.g., Wheeler 2000,
Sarker 2013). Major stakeholders may be motivated to help
resolve an environmental dilemma if  they are formally vested with
the responsibility or perceive themselves as having a stake in it
(Ostrom 2010). Thus, legal action can help define and assign
responsibility, triggering novel stewardship activity (Cosens et al.
2017). For example, local and regional governments in Portland,
Oregon reportedly began sharing resources and working together
to meet new state sustainability requirements after the State of
Oregon formally required them to align their development plans
with its 1970 Statewide Planning Goals (Wheeler 2000). Thus,
vesting interdependent stakeholders with new responsibilities
fundamentally alters the power dynamics and relationships within
a SES, creating change that may encourage coordination (Sarker
2013) even if  conflict exists (e.g., Cosens and Fremier 2014).
Tangible support
However, devolution of responsibility may be overwhelming
without genuine decision-making authority or proper technical
and financial support (Wheeler 2000). Traditional centers of
government may need regulatory tools, such as grants, tax
incentives, and penalties (Wheeler 2000, 2009); new
administrative standards and procedures (Bingham et al. 2005,
Craig and Ruhl 2014); and strengthened commitment to
democratic norms, like subsidiarity (Marshall 2007, Cosens 2013)
and self-governance (Shivakumar 2005) to support meaningful
devolution of responsibility (see also, Ruhl 2011). Lack of
administrative and technical support, inadequate legal authority
to self-organize, and reluctance of government officials to devolve
responsibility (DeCaro et al. 2017) are all major factors commonly
cited for adaptive and cooperative failures in environmental
governance (e.g., Marshall 2007, Clement 2010).
Institutional design principles
Several principles for adaptive governance arise from Vincent and
Elinor Ostrom’s examination of polycentric governance in
federalist societies (Ostrom 1971, 1999) and community-based
environmental governance, or self-governance (Ostrom 1998,
2010). Ostrom Institutional Analysis (Cole and McGinnis 2015)
studies how formal governments influence societal capacity to
adaptively solve complex problems (Shivakumar 2005). It is
important to understand the central role of human behavior and
collective action in determining societal outcomes, paying special
attention to the inherent conflict, or social dilemma(s), involved
in human governance (DeCaro et al. 2017). The fundamental
problem, from a collective action standpoint, is creating
governance systems that enable otherwise self-interested actors,
e.g., political factions and citizens, to cooperatively solve societal
problems, despite differences of opinion, societal standing, and
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ability (e.g., Schultz et al. 2015). Rather than look solely to the
centralized government, Ostrom Institutional Analysis seeks to
understand human capacity for self-organization, in complex
governance systems: communities (Ostrom 1990, 1998),
municipalities (Ostrom 2000), and federations (Ostrom 1971,
1999, see also, Schlager et al. 2011).
Principles
Ostrom Institutional Analysis generated several principles that,
along with concepts of SES resilience, contributed to early
articulations of adaptive governance (Dietz et al. 2003). Ostrom’s
design principles (1990, 2010) are considered important because
they increase capacity for adaptive decision making and
cooperation (Ostrom 2014) and facilitate emergence of self-
organization at smaller scales (e.g., Ostrom 1965, 1992): (a) well-
defined political and geographic boundaries for resource
management, (b) internal mechanisms for neutral and
transparent conflict resolution, (c) participatory decision making
that is inclusive and deliberative, and (d) internal mechanisms for
monitoring, enforcement, and graduated sanctioning to
safeguard essential rules and agreements (Cox et al. 2010). Access
to official legal courts is also essential for disputes that cannot be
easily settled internally, or informally (Ostrom 1965). Extensive
field and laboratory research indicates that these principles
promote cooperation by creating a governance context of
transparency, credibility, and enforceability, which builds trust,
solidifies environmental agreements, and helps maintain
productive relationships (Poteete et al. 2010). Many of these
principles apply to large-scale, complex systems like regional
governments (Wheeler 2000, Schlager and Heikkila 2011) and
federations similar to more traditional government structures
(Sarker 2013).
Informal norms and practical solutions
Ostrom Institutional Analysis also stresses the importance of
formal and informal norms and institutions in effective
governance of SESs (Cole and McGinnis 2015). Self-organizing
agents frequently devise “operational” rules, norms, procedures,
and technical methods to address significant management issues
and to fill voids left by more traditional governments (Ostrom
1990, 2010). These solutions will often be influenced by place-
based knowledge—cultural, ecological, organizational—and
adapted over time (Ostrom 2014), helping increase their fit and
effectiveness at appropriate scales (Ostrom 2007).
Ostrom’s analytical frameworks and adaptive governance
Ostrom (1990, 2007) developed frameworks to help researchers
systematically catalogue and investigate complex factors shaping
self-organization in complex governance systems, comprising
multiple scales and centers of activity. For example, Ostrom’s
(2007) social-ecological system framework (Fig. 4) illustrates
linked “action situations”; their associated actors, governance
systems, and ecosystems; broader social-ecological context, e.g.,
historical, political, economic; and underlying system attributes,
e.g., ecosystem characteristics. With this tool, researchers can
characterize factors and processes affecting adaptive governance
in particular systems, specifically from a standpoint of collective
action and cooperative decision making (McGinnis and Ostrom
2014). We suggest that this, and other tools like it (e.g., Resilience
Alliance 2010), are necessary to understand complex processes
underlying emergence (e.g., Larson et al. 2013, Sarker 2013). We
also point out that Ostrom’s concept of an “action situation”
resembles our “emergence frontier” concept (Fig. 2). Ostrom’s
social-ecological system framework is also compatible with the
concept of “adaptive governance cycles” (Fig 3), identifying
specific factors that may structure windows of opportunity and
crisis (e.g., Anderies and Janssen 2013, Larson et al. 2013). We do
not explicitly illustrate application of Ostrom’s frameworks here.
However, when we illustrate the legal and institutional design
principles later, we do discuss a particularly informative case (see
Sarker 2013), which may exemplify the approach.
Summary
In summary, we envision that the legal and institutional design
principles outlined here (Table 1) complement one another to
create sufficient resources, opportunity, guidance, and authority
for robust cooperation and emergence of adaptive governance
within society. Principles of reflexive law (e.g., legal standards,
floors, and ceilings) support flexibility in decision making, while
principles of legally binding devolution of authority give multiple
stakeholders legal authority to make and act upon those decisions
(Garmestani and Benson 2013, Craig and Ruhl 2014). Technical,
financial, and informational assistance give decision makers
necessary tools to successfully implement decisions and learn
through iterative, experimental processes (Wheeler 2000,
Marshall 2007). Factors like well-defined socio-political and
geographic boundaries, however difficult to achieve, make
management of those systems more feasible, logistically and
politically (Ostrom 1990, Moss and Newig 2010). Institutional
design principles, like internal mechanisms for dispute resolution,
monitoring, and enforcement, coupled with participatory
decision making, support stakeholder self-organization and
simultaneously generate conditions for procedural fairness,
legitimacy, and security needed to cultivate trust and promote
cooperation in complex social-ecological dilemmas (DeCaro et
al. 2017). Finally, legal sunsets and quasi-legislative and -judicial
processes, additionally provide windows of opportunity for
adaptation (Craig and Ruhl 2014), and latitude for informal social
norms and processes to emerge (Bingham et al. 2005), within semi-
rigid governance systems. If  generalized more broadly throughout
society (Ostrom 1994, 1997, Shivakumar 2005), and
complementarily linked across centers of activity, sectors, and
scales (Green et al. 2015), then these design principles-and
perhaps more-may establish a set of mutually reinforcing design
features that can guide and support adaptive governance.  
These legal and institutional design principles are complementary
in other ways. First, informal institutional mechanisms for self-
organization can coexist with formal legal mechanisms, filling
gaps and reinforcing one another (Ostrom 1971, 1999). For
example, grassroots watershed organizations often monitor river
systems, helping to enforce the Clean Water Act despite lax
governmental enforcement, and the Act gives these grassroots
organizations indirect authority to do so (e.g., Arnold et al. 2014).
Moreover, legal systems and government agencies themselves
operate under both formal and informal processes, with capacity
for self-organization (Cosens et al. 2017). Operating with
Ostrom’s institutional principles in mind could improve their
effectiveness (Schlager and Heikkila 2011). Second, as illustrated
in the next section, scholars are exploring ways that legal systems
can support emergence and enable “state-reinforced self-
governance” by creating supportive laws and legal procedures.
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Fig. 4. Ostrom action situation and social-ecological system framework. Analytical framework for understanding dynamic
environmental governance processes in complex social-ecological systems (SESs), or particular centers of activity, analogous to the
Adaptive Water Governance Project’s Emergence Frontiers convention (Fig. 2), and associated SESs approach. Listed variables
indicate categories, and specific instances, of SESs that may shape environmental governance. Source: Reprinted with permission
from McGinnis and Ostrom (2014), Ostrom (2009), and The American Association for the Advancement of Science.
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For example, new legislation could clarify and enhance
participatory decision making (NCL 2013) and public
participation in governmental collaboration (Bingham 2009,
2010); expand the use of quasi-legislative and -judicial processes,
like citizen juries and participatory budgeting, which support
community-based governance (Bingham et al. 2005); and grant
nongovernment stakeholders more authority to manage, regulate,
and enforce some aspects of ecosystem management and
environmental policy (Goddard et al. 2010, Sarker 2013).
DEMONSTRATION OF DESIGN PRINCIPLES
We begin by reviewing a fairly comprehensive case study by Sarker
(2013), which illustrates most of the principles in a large-scale,
polycentric governance system. The Sarker example is also
important because it introduces the concept of “state-reinforced
self-governance,” which we believe aptly encapsulates our vision
of facilitated adaptive governance. The other examples in this
section illustrate different design principles in different legal
domains and scales.  
There are no complete demonstrations or easy blueprints for
adaptive governance (Ostrom 2007, 2014). The cases presented in
this section, though not exhaustive, provide an initial proof of
concept, with informative examples. Further research is needed
to more fully identify particular instances of the design principles,
and their potential nuances and shortcomings, in different
governance systems, legal domains, and scales. To identify the
design principles discussed, we note them in brackets. There are
additional examples in Table 1.
Polycentric governance: irrigation commons of Japan
Sarker (2013) and colleagues (Sarker et al. 2014) describe a
polycentric adaptive governance system surrounding irrigation
water governance in Japan. The system consists of traditional
national, state (prefectural), and local governments, which
provide financial, legal, and technical support to a
semiautonomous federation of farmers who operate in parallel
with traditional forms of governance at these same scales. The
farmers manage major irrigation works and water resources for
agricultural use. Sarker describes this system as “state-reinforced
self-governance,” in which traditional governmental authorities,
in essence, support the emergence of farmer stakeholder groups
in a polycentric system, using complementary legal,
administrative, financial, and other tools. This case is also
informative because Sarker and colleagues (Sarker 2013, Sarker
et al. 2014) used Ostrom’s (2007) social-ecological system
framework (Fig. 4) to thoroughly analyze the broader SES factors
and processes surrounding collective action and cooperative
decision making. Hence, we refer readers to the original articles
for a detailed demonstration of Ostrom Institutional Analysis,
which we believe could be more fully integrated with the current
conventions of emergence frontiers and adaptive governance
cycles in future research. For now, we focus on illustrating key
design principles.  
In 1949, the Japanese national government created a Land
Improvement Law authorizing irrigation water user associations
to manage built infrastructure and water resources in “Land
Improvement Districts.” These districts exist at the local level,
consisting of voluntarily registered farmers with existing (or new)
water rights, specified in the law. Water districts are entrusted to
manage the water resources and operate built infrastructure for
agricultural purposes internally. Hence, they develop their own
operational rules and governance procedures, allocate funds, and
distribute water within their districts [Legally Binding Authority].
Districts are responsible for 100% of financial costs associated
with local development projects but receive considerable funds
from state government when projects benefit society [Tangible
Support]. Conflicts are handled internally, unless formal laws are
violated [Internal Conflict Resolution]. Organizational and
resource monitoring is conducted both internally by elected
auditors, and externally by local and state government, helping
to support credible and transparent enforcement [Internal
Enforcement].  
These districts are semiautonomously self-organized using
democratic processes, whereby interested farmers bring the
possibility of forming an official district organization to regional
farmers for public review and agreement [Participatory Decision
Making]. The district’s official design plan is reviewed by a
governor to ensure compliance with the law [Legally Binding
Responsibility]. Each year, districts draft a new water
management plan based on existing social-ecological conditions,
helping them to adapt to change [Legal Sunsets, Reflexive].
Districts elect a representative to serve on a Council of
Representatives, which operates at the state level, alongside formal
state government. The council makes significant decisions
regarding governance of its federated districts; it also acts as
liaison with formal government [Participatory Decision Making].
For example, state government agencies commonly share their
construction plans with districts and their councils, helping
smooth cooperation and coordination. The councils also
commission an official Administrative Bureau of experts to
provide administrative and technical support [Tangible Support].
There are a total of 5150 districts, organized into 47 of these state-
level units (councils), with 1 national-level unit, which consists of
elected council members. These districts and their water
governance issues are complex, encompassing multiple actors,
geographic characteristics, land uses, and overlapping legal and
institutional (sub)systems from more traditional state and
nontraditional public centers of governance activity. The legal
provisions illustrated in this case span multiple legal domains,
including administrative laws that expand and create authority
for self-organization, and substantive laws that govern regulation,
cooperation, and compliance (see also Sarker et al. 2015).  
According to Sarker and colleagues, this system of state-
reinforced self-governance balances the costs and benefits of
collective action within and among state and nonstate actors,
enabling robust cooperation and adaptation at multiple scales of
environmental governance. These arrangements are reinforced by
robust social norms dating back to historic eras of water
management in Feudal Japan, which make overreach by
traditional governments taboo, but also provide stakeholders with
traditional social-ecological knowledge that can inform effective,
place-based water management. The Japanese government’s
willingness to genuinely devolve authority to farmer stakeholders
and provide tangible support represents a particular strength of
this system, as demonstrably few governments have done so
(DeCaro et al. 2017). For example, Marshall (2007) describes a
similar system in Australia, which failed to enable emergence,
because traditional authorities did not devolve authority
genuinely, or provide financial support.
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Administrative law
Legal scholars have identified rigidities in U.S. administrative law
at federal and state levels that contribute to ineffective governance
and poor adaptation by government agencies (for review see
Cosens 2013, Craig and Ruhl 2014). Shortcomings pertain to
legitimacy (Cosens 2013), flexibility in environmental
management (Craig and Ruhl 2014), and public participation
(Bingham 2009), among other issues. We describe proposed
amendments to administrative law that may facilitate beneficial
emergence within government agencies and support broader
public participation and governmental collaboration. These
amendments illustrate how some of the design principles could
be incorporated in novel legislation for administrative process.  
Craig and Ruhl (2014) describe how the federal Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and statutes like the National
Environmental Protection Act constrain adaptation and self-
organization of state and local government agencies in response
to major environmental stressors like climate change. Because of
these policies, government agencies routinely complete
comprehensive predecision assessments, undergo external judicial
review, and include at least some minimum public participation
whenever they take substantial new action. These procedural
requirements can stifle agency creativity and make it difficult for
agencies to effectively respond to dynamically changing SESs.
These requirements can be further preyed upon by opposition
groups to block agency adaptation, for example via crippling
lawsuits (e.g., Gunderson et al. 2014).  
Craig and Ruhl (2014) outline amendments that may alleviate
some of these constraints, without sacrificing democratic public
involvement or agency flexibility. First, windows of opportunity
for review and public participation could be scheduled
periodically, every three to five years, allowing agencies to test
alternative environmental practices, without crippling review or
continuous public scrutiny [Legal Sunsets] (see Birge et al. 2014
for a case example on the Platte River in Nebraska, USA). Second,
only specific types of environmental projects, with high
uncertainty (e.g., climate change), rapid change, and
controllability (potential for effective human intervention), will
be eligible for these more flexible decision-making procedures,
helping identify appropriate applications for increased flexibility
[Reflexive].  
Public participation in formal government is important, but is
routinely undermined by government agencies who fear losing
control (DeCaro et al. 2017). Hence, there is a challenge to balance
agency flexibility and discretion against essential public
participation. Bingham (2009, 2010) and colleagues (Bingham et
al. 2005) outline amendments to the APA, which may complement
Craig and Ruhl’s (2014) amendments. These adjustments are
designed to enhance public participation and collaborative
decision making, without paralyzing government agencies
[Participatory Decision Making]. Bingham argues that
government agencies are able to avoid meaningful public
participation, partly because requirements codified by the APA
are ambiguous and limited in scope. Government agencies
routinely use superficial forms of public engagement, e.g., public
hearings, that give citizens virtually no influence on important
decisions, and they often ignore public input, or avoid public
participation entirely (Arnstein 1969, Bullard and Johnson 2000,
Marshall 2007, NCL 2013). Indeed, inadequate public
participation, and active marginalization of racial and tribal
groups by government agencies, has been identified as a major
problem in many U.S. river basins (e.g., Arnold et al. 2014, Chaffin
et al. 2014b, Cosens and Fremier 2014).  
The National Civic League’s (NCL 2013) Working Group on
Legal Frameworks for Public Participation has drafted model
provisions to help correct this problem. These include a municipal
ordinance, city charter, and revisions to state APAs. First, the
amendments clarify the standards for adequate public
engagement by carefully defining “participation” to encompass
broader democratic ideals, identifying types of participation that
satisfy those ideals, and outlining best practices to design and
implement participation. However, to support agency discretion,
the amendments authorize agencies to choose whichever of these
mode(s) of public engagement they think best without external
judicial review [Reflexive]. They also permit agencies to
collaborate with one another and the public [Legally Binding
Authority]. Furthermore, agencies would be required to create
and fund a staffed public participation specialist who coordinates
community engagement and trains agency personnel in
participatory practices. The city charter additionally requires city
governments to establish Citizen Advisory Bodies with powers to
set agendas and recommend policy; it also requires “adequate
administrative support,” including training, space, and staff
[Legally Binding Responsibility, Tangible Support]. Bingham
(2010) further proposes a federal Collaborative Governance Act
to complement these provisions, and Bingham et al. (2005)
identify ways that the 1996 Negotiated Rulemaking Act and
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act could be strengthened to
enhance public-government collaboration through nontraditional
forms of community-based governance, such as quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial activities like participatory budgeting and
citizen fact finding.
Regional government, bridging organizations, and agreements
Regional systems of governance (e.g., Wheeler 2000), bridging
organizations (e.g., Gerlak and Heikkila 2011, Garmestani and
Benson 2013), and conservation agreements (e.g., Arnold et al.
2014) sometimes emerge when existing governance processes and
authorities are reorganized and refocused. In some cases, these
entities create new opportunities for emergence, or provide new
forms of authority, which enable more robust adaptive
management, specifically for regional, transboundary, or
multisector water problems (Margerum 2008, Larson et al. 2013).  
For example, when a private dam owner applied to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission to relicense a hydroelectric dam
on the Platte River system in Nebraska, USA (Aiken 1999), this
opened a window for various stakeholders to protest water and
species management under the Endangered Species and Clean
Water Acts, triggering prolonged negotiations, which ultimately
led to formation of regional compacts and governing bodies, with
new roles and powers (Birge et al. 2014). The goal of these new
arrangements was to develop a regional program that would allow
multiple water users (both state and interstate) to use the river
without having those uses contested in court every time; the
negotiations also clarified socio-political, legal, and institutional
boundaries of the social-ecological dilemma, clarifying legal
jurisdiction [Well-Defined Boundaries], and better identifying
responsibilities [Legally Binding Responsibility]. Though
imperfect, the resulting Platte River Recovery and
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Implementation Program (PRRIP), increased cooperation and
adaptive capacity of these users, in their local and regional
management of the river.  
Three states, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Colorado, entered into
the PRRIP, and established a polycentric, cooperative governing
system to assist in local and regional adaptive management. A
governing board consisting of representatives from each state,
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Reclamation,
two environmental representatives, and three water user
representatives [Participatory Decision Making], reviews and
directs the activities specified in the cooperative agreement
[Internal Enforcement] (U.S. Department of the Interior 1997).
The governing board also established special committees to
oversee specific recovery and water management programs. These
committees have adopted an adaptive management approach, in
which management best practices would be empirically tested
and periodically revised, as needed within specified time ranges
[Legal Sunsets, Reflexive] (e.g., State of the Platte 2014).  
Additional steps undertaken in Nebraska, further demonstrate
state-reinforced self-governance. Nebraska’s administration of
surface and groundwater management was historically
fragmented, with different stakeholders managing groundwater
(elected boards of local users) vs. surface water (state of
Nebraska). As such, crucial aspects of groundwater
management, and integrated water management, were out of
Nebraska’s control, which meant Nebraska could not reliably
uphold its obligation to the state partners of the agreement,
jeopardizing trust. In 2004, the Nebraska Legislature corrected
this limitation by adopting LB 962, which authorized the
Department of Natural Resources to declare river basins as over/
fully appropriated [Legally Binding Authority] (Kelly 2010),
which subsequently required local natural resources districts to
adopt well moratoria, and develop integrated water management
plans [Legally Binding Responsibility] (Birge et al. 2014).
Nebraska state government also invested in hydrologic modeling
and monitoring, which provided valuable hydrologic and usage
data to resource districts and users at no cost, helping districts
meet their new responsibilities [Tangible Support].  
Although the Platte River case is more fragmented and less
complete than Sarker’s (2013) example of irrigation in Japan, it
spans multiple types of legal processes and incorporates many
elements of state-reinforced self-governance for this particular
governance issue. In summary, the examples in the section
illustrate some concrete manifestations of the principles,
providing an initial proof of concept, which is open to future
exploration.
CONCLUSIONS: LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
We have strived to outline legal and institutional design principles
that may foster the emergence of adaptive governance within
various centers of governance activity. However, we acknowledge
that these principles are preliminary, and that adaptive
governance is both fundamentally uncertain and fraught with
complex challenges typical of governance in SESs (Chaffin et al.
2014a). To conclude, we discuss some of the more important
theoretical and practical challenges for the current framework,
and identify future directions for research.  
First, although we addressed design principles that may enable
adaptive governance, and provided some concrete examples, we
did not address how to encourage society to adopt these
principles. That is likely to be a nonlinear and contentious process
(DeCaro et al. 2017), which will depend on the specific situations
unfolding in a given SES (e.g., Wheeler 2000). The principles
outlined herein provide a starting point, a framework within
which to work. We suspect that the design principles are
configurative and that supporting more of these enabling
conditions will increase the potential for emergence and adaptive
governance (e.g., DeCaro et al. 2015). Many factors influence
emergence. Leaders with vision, endurance, and political savvy,
also play a significant role (Olsson et al. 2004, Westley et al. 2013).
However, it is not clear what leads decision makers to advance
toward adaptation rather than rigidity or maladaptation (Moser
and Ekstrom 2010, DeCaro et al. 2017).  
Second, we believe civic education is essential to adaptive
governance: the stated design principles cannot fully succeed if
elected officials and citizens do not understand, and appreciate,
the need for both adaptation and self-governance (Shivakumar
2005, DeCaro et al. 2017). Vincent (1997) and Elinor Ostrom
(1998) proposed that self-governance in the U.S. is adversely
affected by a public education system that (a) emphasizes
relatively passive, indirect forms of democratic participation and
(b) does not teach citizens the philosophical basis, or practical
methods, of more direct collaborative approaches, like grassroots
organizing and community-based governance. Bingham et al.
(2008), Lydon et al. (2010), and others provide concrete examples,
educational guidelines, and training for cooperative problem-
solving and leadership in an era of “new governance,” which may
be essential elements of civic education designed to enable
adaptive governance.  
Third, although this synthesis is grounded in broad disciplinary
traditions, multiple case studies (e.g., Cosens et al. 2014), and
extensive literature review, it is ultimately based on a subset of
possible legal frameworks, institutional contexts, and cases.
Additional research is needed to test these ideas in field and
laboratory experiments, and in actual field trials in both similar
and contrasting social and environmental governance contexts.
For example, although the literature used herein spanned
developed and developing nations with different cultural
backgrounds (e.g., Ostrom 1990, Cox et al. 2010), the case
examples explored herein are all from a developed world context,
generally Western democratic culture. Design principles do not
apply directly in different cultural contexts or SESs; they must be
translated and adapted (e.g., Agrawal and Ribot 2014, DeCaro
and Stokes 2013). Future work is needed to investigate if  and how
these ideas translate to more diverse contexts, with potentially
different social norms, ecological issues, and governance systems
(e.g., Ostrom 2007), including laws (Garmestani and Allen 2014).  
Fourth, for simplicity, we have portrayed “rigid” environmental
laws and governance systems primarily as an obstacle to adaptive
governance, despite existing evidence to the contrary. Policy
entrepreneurs sometimes use existing rigidities as a “hammer”
with which to trigger novel changes. For example, Freeman
(2010:410) argues that the primary value of the Endangered
Species Act is its ability to induce crisis from rigidity, forcing “the
reconfiguration of existing ways” (e.g., Chaffin et al. 2014b). Thus,
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existing shortcomings or rigidities in environmental governance
interact with other system components in complex ways.  
Generally speaking, future research needs to descriptively
investigate how emergence frontiers are shaped and constrained
by a constellation of legal, institutional, and social-ecological
factors. Case studies can focus greater attention on this particular
question. We have focused on aspects of law and institutions that
directly support self-organization. However, many other aspects
of law and institutions influence adaptation and self-
organization, by affecting flexibility and governance authority,
perhaps more indirectly: for example, common law (Ruhl 2011,
Green et al. 2014), property law (Doremus and Hanemann 2008),
and law governing judicial decision making (e.g., Arnold and
Gunderson 2013). Furthermore, legal instruments operating in
different domains and at a variety of scales interact; these effects
require more attention. For instance, grassroots watershed
organizations often use the Clean Water Act as a basis for their
legal authority to monitor and enforce water management
activities of actors in their watersheds (e.g., Arnold et al. 2014).
In essence, this creates indirect state-reinforced self-governance,
or legally binding authority, which better enables grassroots
organizations to emerge and self-organize. Investigating these
kinds of issues descriptively, using the enclosed analytical
conventions, should provide a rigorous test of proposed design
principles, identify important areas for refinement and addition,
and more fully inform adaptive governance.  
We must also increase our understanding of how to integrate legal
instruments to enable adaptive governance in transboundary
environmental problems that span multiple jurisdictions, sectors,
and social-ecological (sub)systems (Young 2008, Green et al.
2014, 2015). What design principles could support emergence and
effective cooperation across scales, or jurisdictions, when sectors,
problems, and legal and institutional frameworks need to be
linked?  
We have addressed this question in terms of bridging
organizations and agreements (e.g., Platte River Recovery and
Implementation Program; Birge et al. 2014). We essentially argued
that participatory decision making, legally binding responsibility
and authority, and internal dispute resolution and enforcement
mechanisms (Table 1) may create conditions, which eventually
generate broader integration in the form of partnerships,
compacts, and collaboratives. However, cross-scale integration is
likely to be challenging, as illustrated by the existence of so few
examples of success, and tendency to compartmentalize
governance problems. For example, in Sarker’s (2013) case study,
water irrigation in Japan is governed by a polycentric system of
state-reinforced self-governance, but rice production is governed
centrally by more traditional government mechanisms. Many
broad-scale problems are similarly fragmented. For example, U.
S. coastal reef management (Green et al. 2014) is governed by a
loose network of international law, policies, treaties,
organizations, and legal frameworks, development grants,
research support, and voluntary commitments; however, there is
no substantial sector integration (e.g., land-use law remains
separate from coastal reef management), legally binding
authority and responsibility of scale, or tangible internal
enforcement to ensure robust cooperation. This has resulted in
noted failures of ecosystem management (e.g., De'ath et al. 2012,
Chen and Ganapin 2016). Future research is needed to determine
whether this is the best societies can do at such broad scales given
complexity of integration, or if  not, what role design features like
those outlined herein may play (e.g., Berkes 2007, Stern 2011).  
We therefore present the current article as a working hypothesis,
and we encourage legal and institutional scholars to explore the
implications of this perspective for state-reinforced self-
governance and adaptive environmental governance.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/9036
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